| I. The Three Intuitions | | | | the philosophical school of Phenomenology. |
| IA. Eidetic Intuitions | | | | The a-priori nature of intuitions of the first and the |
| Intuition is supposed to be a form of direct access. | | | | third kind led thinkers, such as Adolf Lasson, to |
| Yet, direct access to what? Does it access directly | | | | associate it with Mysticism. He called it an "intellectual |
| "intuitions" (abstract objects, akin to numbers or | | | | vision" which leads to the "essence of things". Earlier |
| properties - see "Bestowed Existence")? Are | | | | philosophers and theologians labeled the methodical |
| intuitions the objects of the mental act of Intuition? | | | | application of intuitions - the "science of the |
| Perhaps intuition is the mind's way of interacting | | | | ultimates". Of course, this misses the strong |
| directly with Platonic ideals or Phenomenological | | | | emotional content of mystical experiences. |
| "essences"? By "directly" I mean without the | | | | Confucius talked about fulfilling and seeking one's |
| intellectual mediation of a manipulated symbol system, | | | | "human nature" (or "ren") as "the Way". This nature is |
| and without the benefits of inference, observation, | | | | not the result of learning or deliberation. It is innate. It |
| experience, or reason. | | | | is intuitive and, in turn, produces additional, clear |
| Kant thought that both (Euclidean) space and time | | | | intuitions ("yong") as to right and wrong, productive |
| are intuited. In other words, he thought that the | | | | and destructive, good and evil. The "operation of the |
| senses interact with our (transcendental) intuitions to | | | | natural law" requires that there be no rigid codex, but |
| produce synthetic a-priori knowledge. The raw data | | | | only constant change guided by the central and |
| obtained by our senses -our sensa or sensory | | | | harmonious intuition of life. |
| experience - presuppose intuition. One could argue | | | | II. Philosophers on Intuition - An Overview |
| that intuition is independent of our senses. Thus, | | | | IIA. Locke |
| these intuitions (call them "eidetic intuitions") would | | | | But are intuitions really a-priori - or do they develop in |
| not be the result of sensory data, or of calculation, | | | | response to a relatively stable reality and in |
| or of the processing and manipulation of same. Kant's | | | | interaction with it? Would we have had intuitions in a |
| "Erscheiung" ("phenomenon", or "appearance" of an | | | | chaotic, capricious, and utterly unpredictable and |
| object to the senses) is actually a kind of | | | | disordered universe? Do intuitions emerge to |
| sense-intuition later processed by the categories of | | | | counter-balance surprises? |
| substance and cause. As opposed to the | | | | Locke thought that intuition is a learned and |
| phenomenon, the "nuomenon" (thing in itself) is not | | | | cumulative response to sensation. The assumption of |
| subject to these categories. | | | | innate ideas is unnecessary. The mind is like a blank |
| Descartes' "I (think therefore I) am" is an immediate | | | | sheet of paper, filled gradually by experience - by the |
| and indubitable innate intuition from which his | | | | sum total of observations of external objects and of |
| metaphysical system is derived. Descartes' work in | | | | internal "reflections" (i.e., operations of the mind). |
| this respect is reminiscent of Gnosticism in which the | | | | Ideas (i.e., what the mind perceives in itself or in |
| intuition of the mystery of the self leads to | | | | immediate objects) are triggered by the qualities of |
| revelation. | | | | objects. |
| Bergson described a kind of instinctual empathic | | | | But, despite himself, Locke was also reduced to ideal |
| intuition which penetrates objects and persons, | | | | (innate) intuitions. According to Locke, a colour, for |
| identifies with them and, in this way, derives | | | | instance, can be either an idea in the mind (i.e., ideal |
| knowledge about the absolutes - "duration" (the | | | | intuition) - or the quality of an object that causes this |
| essence of all living things) and "élan vital" (the | | | | idea in the mind (i.e., that evokes the ideal intuition). |
| creative life force). He wrote: "(Intuition is an) instinct | | | | Moreover, his "primary qualities" (qualities shared by all |
| that has become disinterested, self-conscious, | | | | objects) come close to being eidetic intuitions. |
| capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging | | | | Locke himself admits that there is no resemblance or |
| it indefinitely." Thus, to him, science (the use of | | | | correlation between the idea in the mind and the |
| symbols by our intelligence to describe reality) is the | | | | (secondary) qualities that provoked it. Berkeley |
| falsification of reality. Only art, based on intuition, | | | | demolished Locke's preposterous claim that there is |
| unhindered by mediating thought, not warped by | | | | such resemblance (or mapping) between PRIMARY |
| symbols - provides one with access to reality. | | | | qualities and the ideas that they provoke in the mind. |
| Spinoza's and Bergson's intuited knowledge of the | | | | It would seem therefore that Locke's "ideas in the |
| world as an interconnected whole is also an "eidetic | | | | mind" are in the mind irrespective and independent of |
| intuition". | | | | the qualities that produce them. In other words, they |
| Spinoza thought that intuitive knowledge is superior | | | | are a-priori. Locke resorts to abstraction in order to |
| to both empirical (sense) knowledge and scientific | | | | repudiate it. |
| (reasoning) knowledge. It unites the mind with the | | | | Locke himself talks about "intuitive knowledge". It is |
| Infinite Being and reveals to it an orderly, holistic, | | | | when the mind "perceives the agreement or |
| Universe. | | | | disagreement of two ideas immediately by |
| Friedrich Schleiermacher and Rudolf Otto discussed | | | | themselves, without the intervention of any other... |
| the religious experience of the "numinous" (God, or | | | | the knowledge of our own being we have by |
| the spiritual power) as a kind of intuitive, pre-lingual, | | | | intuition... the mind is presently filled with the clear light |
| and immediate feeling. | | | | of it. It is on this intuition that depends all the |
| Croce distinguished "concept" (representation or | | | | certainty and evidence of all our knowledge... |
| classification) from "intuition" (expression of the | | | | (Knowledge is the) perception of the connection of |
| individuality of an objet d'art). Aesthetic interest is | | | | and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of |
| intuitive. Art, according to Croce and Collingwood, | | | | any of our ideas." |
| should be mainly concerned with expression (i.e., with | | | | Knowledge is intuitive intellectual perception. Even |
| intuition) as an end unto itself, unconcerned with | | | | when demonstrated (and few things, mainly ideas, |
| other ends (e.g., expressing certain states of mind). | | | | can be intuited and demonstrated - relations within |
| Eidetic intuitions are also similar to "paramartha satya" | | | | the physical realm cannot be grasped intuitively), each |
| (the "ultimate truth") in the Madhyamika school of | | | | step in the demonstration is observed intuitionally. |
| Buddhist thought. The ultimate truth cannot be | | | | Locke's "sensitive knowledge" is also a form of |
| expressed verbally and is beyond empirical (and | | | | intuition (known as "intuitive cognition" in the Middle |
| illusory) phenomena. Eastern thought (e.g. Zen | | | | Ages). It is the perceived certainty that there exist |
| Buddhism) uses intuition (or experience) to study | | | | finite objects outside us. The knowledge of one's |
| reality in a non-dualistic manner. | | | | existence is an intuition as well. But both these |
| IB. Emergent Intuitions | | | | intuitions are judgmental and rely on probabilities. |
| A second type of intuition is the "emergent intuition". | | | | IIB. Hume |
| Subjectively, the intuiting person has the impression | | | | Hume denied the existence of innate ideas. According |
| of a "shortcut" or even a "short circuiting" of his | | | | to him, all ideas are based either on sense |
| usually linear thought processes often based on trial | | | | impressions or on simpler ideas. But even Hume |
| and error. This type of intuition feels "magical", a | | | | accepted that there are propositions known by the |
| quantum leap from premise to conclusion, the | | | | pure intellect (as opposed to propositions dependent |
| parsimonious selection of the useful and the workable | | | | on sensory input). These deal with the relations |
| from a myriad possibilities. Intuition, in other words, is | | | | between ideas and they are (logically) necessarily |
| rather like a dreamlike truncated thought process, the | | | | true. Even though reason is used in order to prove |
| subjective equivalent of a wormhole in Cosmology. It | | | | them - they are independently true all the same |
| is often preceded by periods of frustration, dead | | | | because they merely reveal the meaning or |
| ends, failures, and blind alleys in one's work. | | | | information implicit in the definitions of their own |
| Artists - especially performing artists (like musicians) - | | | | terms. These propositions teach us nothing about the |
| often describe their interpretation of an artwork (e.g., | | | | nature of things because they are, at bottom, self |
| a musical piece) in terms of this type of intuition. | | | | referential (equivalent to Kant's "analytic |
| Many mathematicians and physicists (following a kind | | | | propositions"). |
| of Pythagorean tradition) use emergent intuitions in | | | | IIC. Kant |
| solving general nonlinear equations (by guessing the | | | | According to Kant, our senses acquaint us with the |
| approximants) or partial differential equations. | | | | particulars of things and thus provide us with |
| Henri Poincaret insisted (in a presentation to the | | | | intuitions. The faculty of understanding provided us |
| Psychological Society of Paris, 1901) that even simple | | | | with useful taxonomies of particulars ("concepts"). |
| mathematical operations require an "intuition of | | | | Yet, concepts without intuitions were as empty and |
| mathematical order" without which no creativity in | | | | futile as intuitions without concepts. Perceptions |
| mathematics is possible. He described how some of | | | | ("phenomena") are the composite of the sensations |
| his creative work occurred to him out of the blue | | | | caused by the perceived objects and the mind's |
| and without any preparation, the result of emergent | | | | reactions to such sensations ("form"). These |
| intuitions. These intuitions had "the characteristics of | | | | reactions are the product of intuition. |
| brevity, suddenness and immediate certainty... Most | | | | IID. The Absolute Idealists |
| striking at first is this appearance of sudden | | | | Schelling suggested a featureless, undifferentiated, |
| illumination, a manifest sign of long, unconscious prior | | | | union of opposites as the Absolute Ideal. Intellectual |
| work. The role of this unconscious work in | | | | intuition entails such a union of opposites (subject and |
| mathematical invention appears to me incontestable, | | | | object) and, thus, is immersed and assimilated by the |
| and traces of it would be found in other cases where | | | | Absolute and becomes as featureless and |
| it is less evident." | | | | undifferentiated as the Absolute is. |
| Subjectively, emergent intuitions are indistinguishable | | | | Objective Idealists claimed that we can know |
| from insights. Yet insight is more "cognitive" and | | | | ultimate (spiritual) reality by intuition (or thought) |
| structured and concerned with objective learning and | | | | independent of the senses (the mystical argument). |
| knowledge. It is a novel reaction or solution, based on | | | | The mediation of words and symbol systems only |
| already acquired responses and skills, to new stimuli | | | | distorts the "signal" and inhibits the effective |
| and challenges. Still, a strong emotional (e.g., aesthetic) | | | | application of one's intuition to the attainment of real, |
| correlate usually exists in both insight and emergent | | | | immutable, knowledge. |
| intuition. | | | | IIE. The Phenomenologists |
| Intuition and insight are strong elements in creativity, | | | | The Phenomenological point of view is that every |
| the human response to an ever changing | | | | thing has an invariable and irreducible "essence" |
| environment. They are shock inducers and | | | | ("Eidos", as distinguished from contingent information |
| destabilizers. Their aim is to move the organism from | | | | about the thing). We can grasp this essence only |
| one established equilibrium to the next and thus | | | | intuitively ("Eidetic Reduction"). This process - of |
| better prepare it to cope with new possibilities, | | | | transcending the concrete and reaching for the |
| challenges, and experiences. Both insight and intuition | | | | essential - is independent of facts, concrete objects, |
| are in the realm of the unconscious, the simple, and | | | | or mental constructs. But it is not free from |
| the mentally disordered. Hence the great importance | | | | methodology ("free variation"), from factual |
| of obtaining insights and integrating them in | | | | knowledge, or from ideal intuitions. The |
| psychoanalysis - an equilibrium altering therapy. | | | | Phenomenologist is forced to make the knowledge |
| IC. Ideal Intuitions | | | | of facts his point of departure. He then applies a |
| The third type of intuition is the "ideal intuition". These | | | | certain methodology (he varies the nature and |
| are thoughts and feelings that precede any | | | | specifications of the studied object to reveal its |
| intellectual analysis and underlie it. Moral ideals and | | | | essence) which relies entirely on ideal intuitions (such |
| rules may be such intuitions (see "Morality - a State | | | | as the rules of logic). |
| of Mind?"). Mathematical and logical axioms and basic | | | | Phenomenology, in other words, is an Idealistic form |
| rules of inference ("necessary truths") may also turn | | | | of Rationalism. It applies reason to discover Platonic |
| out to be intuitions. These moral, mathematical, and | | | | (Idealism) essences. Like Rationalism, it is not empirical |
| logical self-evident conventions do not relate to the | | | | (it is not based on sense data). Actually, it is |
| world. They are elements of the languages we use | | | | anti-empirical - it "brackets" the concrete and the |
| to describe the world (or of the codes that regulate | | | | factual in its attempt to delve beyond appearances |
| our conduct in it). It follows that these a-priori | | | | and into essences. It calls for the application of |
| languages and codes are nothing but the set of our | | | | intuition (Anschauung) to discover essential insights |
| embedded ideal intuitions. | | | | (Wesenseinsichten). |
| As the Rationalists realized, ideal intuitions (a class of | | | | "Phenomenon" in Phenomenology is that which is |
| undeniable, self-evident truths and principles) can be | | | | known by consciousness and in it. Phenomenologists |
| accessed by our intellect. Rationalism is concerned | | | | regarded intuition as a "pure", direct, and primitive |
| with intuitions - though only with those intuitions | | | | way of reducing clutter in reality. It is immediate and |
| available to reason and intellect. Sometimes, the | | | | the basis of a higher level perception. A philosophical |
| boundary between intuition and deductive reasoning | | | | system built on intuition would, perforce, be non |
| is blurred as they both yield the same results. | | | | speculative. Hence, Phenomenology's emphasis on the |
| Moreover, intuitions can be combined to yield | | | | study of consciousness (and intuition) rather than on |
| metaphysical or philosophical systems. Descartes | | | | the study of (deceiving) reality. It is through |
| applied ideal intuitions (e.g., reason) to his eidetic | | | | "Wesensschau" (the intuition of essences) that one |
| intuitions to yield his metaphysics. Husserl, | | | | reaches the invariant nature of things (by applying |
| Twardowki, even Bolzano did the same in developing | | | | free variation techniques). |